Re: INTERNATIONAL STANDARD FOR LOGIC: CSMF
Chris Menzel <cmenzel@kbssun1.tamu.edu>
From: Chris Menzel <cmenzel@kbssun1.tamu.edu>
To: fritz@rodin.wustl.edu
Cc: cg@cs.umn.edu, interlingua@ISI.EDU, srkb@cs.umbc.edu,
E.Hunt@cgsmtp.comdt.uscg.mil, bhacker@nara.gov,
duschka@cs.stanford.edu, genesereth@cs.stanford.edu,
jksharp@sandia.gov, msingh@bcr.cc.bellcore.com,
msmith@vax2.cstp.umkc.edu, roger@ci.deere.com, scott@ontek.com,
sharadg@atc.boeing.com, skperez@mcimail.com, tony@ontek.com,
zeleny@math.ucla.edu
In-reply-to: <9409091531.AA08687@rodin.wustl.edu> (fritz@rodin.wustl.edu)
Subject: Re: INTERNATIONAL STANDARD FOR LOGIC: CSMF
Message-id: <94Sep9.120526cdt.9765@kbssun1.tamu.edu>
Date: Fri, 9 Sep 1994 12:05:24 -0500
Sender: owner-srkb@cs.umbc.edu
Precedence: bulk
Fritz,
Thank you very much for your thoughtful reply. You wrote:
Chris Menzel said of Scott domains:
FL:>> Actors" in Conceptual Graphs are
>> procedural. Genesereth has stated often that KIF is declarative
>> and not procedural. To provide declarative semantics for
>> procedures requires correct treatment of recursive functions,
>> functions of functions, and programs which loop infinitely and
>> never halt; this requires "reflexive" algebraic structures of
>> partial functions like the continuous lattices of Dana Scott, which
>> leads to domain theory and necessary distinctions which are
>> strongly higher-order.
CM:>Once again, mere quantification over functions, functions of
>functions, etc. does not necessarily mean you are using a higher-order
>logic. These are all first-order objects in set theory. Scott
>domains in particular are definable (and typically, are defined, even
>in Scott's own papers) in first-order set theory.
Scott structures include continuous lattices. The required lattice
definition "For every subset X \subseteq B, the supremum \bigvee X
exists" is second order and strongly so (Dickmann, in Barwise &
Feferman, p. 324).
Sorry, I was unclear; I should have said Scott domains were
"definable_1" in set theory in the sense introduced in my previous
post, i.e., the definitions (stated in the language of set theory)
pick out the right notions in a standard model of set theory. They
are of course not first-order definable in the stronger sense that
guarantees nothing unintended falls under the definition; for that you
need to ensure that the "for every subset X \subseteq B" quantifier,
if written in a second-order language, does indeed range over all
subsets of B, and that's just what true second-order semantics
guarantees. My question, once again, had *not* to do with the
undeniable value and importance of higher-order model theory, but with
whether, *in the context of an Interlingua*, using a higher-order
language with the stipulation that it be interpreted with full
higher-order model theory buys you any more than using first-order set
theory with the stipulation that it be interpreted in a standard
model.
Best wishes,
Chris Menzel
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Christopher Menzel | Internet -> cmenzel@tamu.edu
Philosophy, Texas A&M University | Phone ----> (409) 845-8764
College Station, TX 77843-4237 | Fax ------> (409) 845-0458
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